In an exclusive interview with Jewish News marking this week's 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, the former prime minister reflects on how early existential setbacks were overcome and unlikely victory achieved.
Fifty years ago this week Egypt and Syria invaded Israel in a surprise attack during Yom Kippur. To mark the anniversary, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak spoke to Jewish News about his predecessors’ existential failures ahead of the conflict and how they managed to overcome the odds to complete one of the most “brilliant military victories” in Israel’s history.
Barak, the only Israeli to have held the positions of military intelligence chief, IDF chief, defence minister and prime minister, described what he called “triangular failures” in intelligence, operation and leadership.
Declassified documents over the years revealed that both Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, Mossad chief Zvi Zamir, IDF chief David Elazar, and Military Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira significantly underestimated Egypt and Syria, outright dismissing crucial intelligence that painted a clear picture of the hostile intentions of the two Arab nations.
Israel even had an agent in Egypt, Ashraf Marwan, son-in-law of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and advisor to his successor, President Anwar Sadat, who collaborated with Mossad and delivering accurate intelligence about attack plans.
According to Barak, there is no doubt that, more than anything else, the war was an intelligence failure: “They promised that they were capable of giving at least 48 hours early notice before a major war. And for the political leadership, and on an operational level, it was kind of an insurance. Because the army could mobilise the whole reserve forces in less than 48 hours and be ready. In such a scenario, the chances of the enemy making any major achievement would dramatically lower.”
Barak, who fought in the war as a commander of an IDF tank unit in Sinai, said several mistakes were made on an operational level.
“The army didn’t have a plan B. What happens if intelligence fails? There was an underlying assumption, stemming from certain arrogance from the results of the 1967 war, that if the arabs would stupid enough to attack us, Israel would easily win,” he said.
“The political leadership made a mistake in listening too seriously to the intelligence of Mossad and the military. The leadership had their own independent sources. They didn’t just hear abstract assessments of the material,” Barak said, mentioning the visit by Jordan’s King Hussein to the Mossad headquarter in Israel before the war as an example.
"It wasn’t until 6 October, on Yom Kippur, that the leadership would admit that war was on its way. At 2pm, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous attacks, in the Sinai Desert and Golan Heights."
“He warned Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan that to the best of his judgment Sadat was preparing a full scale war together with (Syria’s president) Assad. We don’t know why, but they ignored it,” he said.
It wasn’t until 6 October, on Yom Kippur, that the leadership would admit that war was on its way. At 2pm, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous attacks in the Sinai Desert and Golan Heights.
Israel was vastly outnumbered militarily on the borders with Syria and Egypt, with both countries mobilising their forces in the days leading up to the war. Dayan infamously had a nervous breakdown shortly after the war broke out and allegedly suggested to Meir that Israel should consider preparing the option of using nuclear weapons.
After suffering heavy losses the first couple of days, Israel turned the tide, something Barak to this day considers an outstanding achievement in modern military history.
“On an operational level it was a brilliant military victory for us. In my opinion even more so than in 1967. Surprise can cause big powers to collapse (such Nazi Germany’s attack on France in WWII).
"After 18 days of fighting the war ended. 2,656 Israel soldiers were killed, 298 soldiers were taken as prisoners s of war and over 7,000 soldiers were injured. Egypt lost some 7,700 soldiers and Syria an estimated 3,500."
“In our case, within six days we were closer to Damascus and 10 days later closer to Cairo than before the war. That’s impressive, from a military point of view. Our objective was to remove the threat and we did,” he said.
“But Sadat didn’t have an objective to reconquer all of Sinai or go as far as Beersheba or Tel Aviv. Sadat mainly wanted to use all his force for very limited objectives to get certain holds on the other side of the Suez Canal and prove to Israel that he could shake their self confidence,” he added.
War and peace
While Barak holds Golda Meir in high regard, describing her as “very strong and effective” during the war, Israel’s first female prime minister made a huge mistake when she refused to find a diplomatic solution before the war.
“For many years I thought there was no way to have avoided the war because the Egyptians couldn’t swallow the humiliation of the 1967 war and save their honour through war. But when you read all the documents that have been exposed, you find that the position of our government was not easy to defend,” he said.
Barak points to the fact that Sadat tried to initiate negotiations with Israel through Washington in 1973. “Yes, Sadat said he wanted all of Sinai, which was against our position, but in stages over time,” Barak said.
“Months before the war there was a discussion in the inner cabinet, where they agreed that all signs pointed to Egypt wouldn’t swallow the defeat from 1967. So inevitably we were headed for war. But there was one minister (Israel Galili) who said ‘gentlemen, if we all agree that we are headed for war, we are not the government here, just three ministers, we don’t have a mandate to decide if we are going to war. We have to bring in the whole government to discuss it.’ But they never did. It’s a great responsibility to go into war without even trying to avoid it,” Barak continued.
After 18 days of fighting the war ended. 2,656 Israel soldiers were killed, 298 soldiers were taken as prisoners s of war and over 7,000 soldiers were injured. Egypt lost some 7,700 soldiers and Syria an estimated 3,500.
The future peace treaty with Egypt in 1979 and ceasefire with Syria, Barak said, “were born from the battles in Golan and Sinai”.
He concludes: “Peace with Egypt stood firm even when Israeli tanks rolled into Beirut and when the extreme Muslim Brotherhood took power in Egypt they didn’t cancel the peace agreement with Israel.”
03/10/2023 by JEWISH NEWS
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